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This paper explores the motif of representation in a variety of texts to better understand 
the power that these representations have as a social force. The use of representation in literature 
has changed throughout history, and the paper analyzes the role of representation in six different 
fictional texts and in several different critical theories. It gives further consideration to the 
changing nature of photography in a postmodern world where a true original is never created due 
to the proliferation of cell phone cameras, digital photograph sharing, and photography-specific 
social networking websites. In an increasingly visually literate world, photography is a common 
lens through which individuals choose to see and experience the world around them, and the 
proliferation and ease of photography is shaping the way society uses and understands 
representations. Ultimately, the paper investigates portraiture and photography from literary and 
historical lenses and proves, if not the value of representations in themselves, the importance of 
representations for society.  
Keywords: representation, photography, visual rhetoric, technological reproducibility 
  
INTRODUCTION: CECI N’EST PAS UNE PHOTOGRAPHIER  
 
Fig. 1. Magritte, René. The Treachery of Images. 1928-29. Oil on canvas. Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art, Los Angeles.  
This is not a pipe—it is a painting of a pipe. Surrealist artist René Magritte’s 1928 
painting, The Treachery of Images, (see fig. 1) introduces the issue at the heart of representation: 
that which is represented is not real. In a world increasingly infatuated with and dependent on 
representations, whether a photograph, a painting, a Facebook profile, or a description of any 
other sort, the issue of how one presents, represents, and re-presents oneself is a central issue 
when considering the truth of one’s identity—and the truth of the identity of others. 
 Plato addresses this issue when he introduces the concept of mimesis in Republic. For 
Plato, art is merely a representation of nature instead of a natural creation; furthermore, it is a 
representation that should not be trusted. In Book X, Plato, speaking through Socrates, uses the 
example of a bed to explain to the character of Glaucon that a bed is a representation of the Ideal 
bed created by the progenitor, God. God created a single real bed—the only real bed—and every 
bed that a craftsman or joiner makes is simply an imperfect representation of that bed.  
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  A bed, therefore, is removed once from its true, absolute, and ideal form as it exists in 
the mind of God, the intelligible realm of knowledge and forms. The bed is removed once more 
from reality when the painter paints the bed. Just as Magritte’s pipe is not a pipe—it is a painting 
of a pipe—the painter’s bed is not a bed but is a representation of a bed. The painter is a 
representer, “someone who deals with things which are, in fact, two generations away from 
reality” (Republic 66). Playwrights and writers are also representers; a written description of a 
bed is no more a bed than a painting of a bed. 
 Plato, however, cautions that the representer will naturally find himself concerned with 
appearance alone; his work of representation is divorced from truth because the truth of a 
particular form is not necessary in order for one to represent it accurately. One could paint a 
picture of a bed without having any knowledge of how a bed is made or used by paying attention 
only to the appearance of the bed: “An image-maker, a representer, understands only appearance, 
while reality is beyond him” (Republic 70). For the representer, the appearance of the object is 
more important than an understanding of the object. Even the craftsman, however, fails to 
understand the object as well as the one who uses the object. It is only the user, according to 
Plato, who can have an intimate knowledge of the object—of how well it works in actual 
practice. A craftsman who makes a bed based on theories of weight distribution and a knowledge 
of joints must rely on the sleeper to know whether the bed behaves as it ought. 
 The issue that Plato has with representers is that they, too often, fail to represent objects 
accurately and fail to repent of their ignorance. In such cases, the representer steps away from the 
truth and begins increasingly to represent falsehood: “[D]espite the [representer’s] ignorance of 
the good and bad aspects of things, he’ll go on representing them. But what he’ll be representing, 
apparently, is whatever appeals to a large, if ignorant, audience” (Republic 71). The audience is, 
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therefore, of primary importance in shaping not only what is represented, but also how 
something is represented.  
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” is also instrumental to one’s understanding of Plato’s 
philosophy of representation. Prisoners are trapped in the cave, and they can perceive only the 
shadows of puppets cast by a fire that is hidden from their sight. They can perceive only a 
representation of a representation, but, to them, “the truth would be literally nothing but the 
shadows of the images” (“The Allegory of the Cave” 74). If a painter were to paint what he saw, 
he would be creating naught but a representation of a representation of a representation, 
conveying a truth that is far removed from truth itself. 
Thus, the first remove from truth occurs when a being or object is created to represent an 
ideal Form. The second remove from truth takes place when an artist reproduces that being, 
whether through painting, drawing, or photographing the being. A further complication in the 
matter of representation is the ability with which technology has furnished a representer to 
reproduce his or her representation. The technological reproducibility of images, a concept 
attributed to literary critic Walter Benjamin, adds a third remove from the truth of the ideal form. 
The image that the representer—the painter, writer, or photographer—creates can be reproduced 
and disseminated with very little consideration of the truth of the representation. 
As time progresses, different philosophers, theorists, and critics investigate the many 
different uses of representation. Whereas Plato valued representations according to their 
proximity to truth, later philosophers, theorists, and critics value other aspects of representation, 
such as its ability to convey beauty and create an experience for the viewer. Plato’s “Allegory of 
the Cave” can serve as a starting point for understanding the relationship between representation 
and truth because it call into question the accuracy of representation and perception, but other 
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theories must be studied before one can analyze the relationship between representation and 
beauty or the role of representation in creating authentic experiences. Roland Barthes’s Camera 
Lucida (1980) and Susan Sontag’s On Photography (1977) provide two such theoretical 
approaches to photography, the former discussing how the self is affected by photography and 
the latter suggesting that society has come to embrace idealized images and representations over 
reality. The philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche (1873) regarding the tendency of humans to 
understand time-honored illusions as true further addresses the question of the relationship 
between representation and truth. An important literary critic, Walter Benjamin (1936), discusses 
authenticity, aura, and the original in a time of the technological reproduction of art. 
Furthermore, Fredric Jameson (1982) provides a postmodern critique of nostalgic art, discussing 
how humorous parodies of popular images can lose their humor and become meaningless. These 
critics provide an additional framework for understanding the ways in which society understands 
and uses—or abuses—representation.  
Various authors have observed, whether consciously or subconsciously, the often-
troubled relationship between society and its expectations of how representations should 
function, and the motif of representation first emerges in the form of paintings and drawings. The 
Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) by Oscar Wilde addresses non-photographic representation with 
the titular picture of Dorian Gray. Dorian’s picture proves to be a more accurate representation of 
his soul than he is, so Dorian’s appearance and the reality of his inner self are brought into 
conflict. “The Real Thing” (1892) by Henry James likewise deals with non-photographic 
representation. In the short story, the narrator attempts to draw Major and Mrs. Monarch, a 
gentleman and gentlewoman who have fallen on hard times, as illustrations for novels, but the 
narrator only succeeds in representing them exactly as they are instead of how the characters are. 
5 
 
In this case, the fake things, his models who are pretending to be noble, triumph over the real 
things.  
Portraits and drawings, however, are not the only forms of representation that exist in 
literature. Photographic representation in one of its earliest forms, daguerreotyping, is used in 
The House of the Seven Gables (1851) by Nathaniel Hawthorne both to show the disparity 
between the inner character and outer appearance of Judge Pyncheon and to document the event 
of his eventual death. Jude the Obscure (1895) by Thomas Hardy addresses the need for 
authentic images and the danger of idealizing others through the failed relationship between the 
title character, Jude, and his true love, Sue. In All the King’s Men (1946) by Robert Penn Warren, 
staged photographs are used to reinforce a certain image of Willie Talos, and White Noise (1985) 
by Don DeLillo uses the image of the Most Photographed Barn in America to address the 
growing reality of a consumer consciousness. A critical examination of these texts shows that 
societies in different times and places use representation for a variety of ends including truth-
telling, portraying beauty, and creating and capturing experiences. As the technology used to 
create representations changes, society’s relationship with representation changes not only in 
form but also in function.  
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1: TWO PERSPECTIVES ON PHOTOGRAPHIC THEORY 
  It is important to remember that photography, while it is one specific form of 
representation, developed from earlier forms of representation that include drawing and painting. 
These early forms of representation begin to yoke representation and truth together, as did 
philosophers like Plato, but later critics like Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag challenge and 
stretch this relationship. Throughout Barthes’s and Sontag’s works, a post-truth view of 
photographic representation is considered, but their analyses of early photographic forms of 
representation and their considerations of pre-photographic forms of representation are 
invaluable in a discussion of the motif of representation. 
Although there are critics who analyze photography from a strictly visual perspective, 
analyzing the composition, lighting, color, and other visual elements of photographs, it makes 
the most sense to consider the views of two literary critics who examine the photograph, but who 
use an approach that is more abstract and theoretical than strict visual theorists so that these 
theories can be applied to other types of representation. These two critics, Susan Sontag and 
Roland Barthes, are contemporaneous; Sontag published her work On Photography, a collection 
of essays published individually from 1973 to 1977, while Barthes’s Camera Lucida was written 
in 1980 and translated into English in 1981. The works of Sontag and Barthes interact with each 
other, both implicitly and explicitly. 
 Barthes’s work deals in abstractions and takes a more personal approach to photography 
than does Sontag’s, which is better grounded in the concrete than Barthes’s. Barthes provides a 
good foundation for the overall importance of the photograph as a transformative experience for 





 1.1: PHOTOGRAPHY AS ANIMATION: THE STUDIUM AND THE PUNCTUM 
 Roland Barthes primarily discusses the process of portrait-photography from the 
perspectives of a subject and of a viewer. This is important to the study of representation in 
literature because portraits, like photographs, depend on a triad—the artist, the artist’s 
inspiration, and the viewer—to make meaning of the work. Barthes, not an artist himself, does 
not discuss the relationship of the artist to the artwork, but his analysis of the subject of portrait-
photographs and the viewer of portrait-photographs can be generalized to include the subjects 
and viewers of non-photographic representations.  
Barthes introduces a complex dilemma when considering the portrait-photograph: a 
portrait-photograph of Barthes himself “is the advent of [himself] as other” (12), which means 
that, according to social construct theory, the portrait-photograph is a way by which the 
individual—Barthes, in this case—can come to consciousness. The painted portrait, too, can 
allow one to look upon the image of self as other and therefore come to consciousness. A 
problem that Barthes identifies with the portrait-photograph’s representation of the self is that it 
is, according to Barthes’s own experience at the very least, inaccurate. Barthes discusses the 
variety of selves and identities that converge in the portrait-photograph: “the one I think I am, the 
one I want others to think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use 
of to exhibit his art” (13). For Barthes, this is troubling: the portrait-photograph should be the 
one form of representation that perfectly captures the essence of self because it is an objective 
visual duplicate of reality. Instead, he worries that the portrait-photograph only captures him 
imitating himself, leaving him to “suffer from a sensation of inauthenticity” (Barthes 13). 
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Perhaps the only reason that the portrait-photograph allows the self to view the self as the other 
is because the self that the portrait-photograph captures is not the self at all. 
 When considering Barthes’s views about the inauthenticity of portrait-photographs in the 
context of Walter Benjamin’s warning about the destruction of the aura in an age of 
technological reproducibility, Barthes’s beliefs are particularly challenging. Benjamin purports 
that “replicating the work many times over . . . substitutes a mass existence for a unique 
existence” (1054). This unique existence is the aura of the original, the authenticity an image 
derives as a result of its singular physical and temporal identity. If even the portrait-photograph 
cannot accurately represent the nature of the self, each reproduction destroys not the aura of the 
original self but the aura of the inauthentic other. In one sense, this could seem encouraging: if 
all that was being destroyed was an inaccurate representation, there is less at stake when art is 
technologically reproduced.  
At the same time, one must heed Friedrich Nietzsche’s warning about forgetting that 
certain illusions are only that: illusions. Nietzsche purports that truth is “a mobile army of 
metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been 
subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration” (Nietzsche 768). 
When one thinks that the inauthentic portrait-photograph is true, the technological reproduction 
of the inauthentic portrait-photograph succeeds only in removing one further and further from 
the truth. Even Barthes remarks on the unintentional truth of calling a portrait a “likeness”: “All I 
look like is other photographs of myself, and this to infinity: no one is ever anything but the copy 
of a copy, real or mental” (102). Technological reproduction, it would seem, is doomed to fail to 
convey truth not only because it lacks the aura of the original but also because the original 
portrait-photograph is itself an imperfect copy of a copy. The subject, whether human or 
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inanimate, is a copy of Plato’s ideal Form, and the first representation, whether a painting or a 
photograph, is a representation of a representation. When images are reproduced, the portrait or 
portrait-photograph is removed one step further from the truth; technological reproductions are, 
therefore, reproductions of representations of representations of the ideal Form. 
 Barthes, however, is not only concerned with the subject of the portrait-photograph; he is 
also concerned about the impact of the portrait-photograph on the viewer. An interesting 
component of Barthes’s theory of how photography affects the viewer is that of adventure. When 
speaking of the allure that certain photographs hold, Barthes rejects the idea that photographs 
primarily fascinate or interest the viewer; instead, photographs instill a sense of adventure in the 
viewer. The photograph achieves this by animating the viewer and by letting the viewer animate 
it (Barthes 20). Barthes contends that without this animation, the photograph does not truly exist. 
This two-way engagement is reminiscent of Barthes’s more popular ideas regarding a work 
becoming a text; both the reader and the text must be engaged in the process. The death of the 
author must be considered with regard to postmodern texts—and, by extension, the 
representations within those texts—because it rejects the question of truth and embraces the 
experience of the reader or viewer. 
 Barthes contends that there are two possible elements of the photograph that allow it to 
animate and be animated by the viewer: the studium (Latin: study) and the punctum (Latin: 
point). The studium is an “application to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, 
enthusiastic commitment . . . but without special acuity” (Barthes 26). It is, in other words, the 
element of the photograph—and, more broadly, of representation—that makes it visually 




 The punctum, on the other hand, introduces questions of morality and incorporates a 
degree of poignancy. The punctum “rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and 
pierces [the viewer]” (Barthes 26). The more violent connotation with which Barthes imbues the 
punctum reflects the differences in the effects produced by the studium and the punctum; the 
presence of the studium pleases or displeases the viewer, but the presence of the punctum pierces 
the studium and ultimately creates in the viewer of the representation a sense of meaning and 
animation deeper than the more superficial meaning created by the studium. 
 Barthes makes an interesting assertion concerning the punctum: the punctum is best 
understood after the viewer has turned away from the photograph. Indeed, the eye’s concern is 
the studium, but the mind’s concern is the punctum. To use Freudian terms, the studium is 
manifest, but the punctum may be latent. Even if the punctum is seemingly obvious because a 
certain aspect of the photograph immediately arrests the viewer, the punctum may be something 
else entirely and “be revealed only after the fact, when the photograph is no longer in front of 
[the viewer] . . . . [One] may know better a photograph [one] remember[s] than a photograph 
[one is] looking at, as if direct vision oriented its language wrongly, engaging it in an effort of 
description which will always miss its point of effect, the punctum” (Barthes 53). In the context 
of studying representation in literature, where the roles of the reader of the story and the viewer 
of the portrait or photograph are not congruent, it is important to consider how the viewer of the 
image within the narrative engages with it—whether in the physical realm of agreeableness or in 
the mental, and sometimes spiritual, realm of poignancy—because it is through the eyes of the 
viewer in the narrative that the reader of the text sees the representation. 
 Another element of photography that is relevant in the present context is the relationship 
between photography and nostalgia. Photography, Barthes asserts, is a unique form of 
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representation because the referent, the subject of the photograph, must have existed at some 
point in time (76). Even if a portrait reveals only a copy of a copy, it also shows “not a memory, 
an imagination, a reconstruction . . . such as art lavishes upon us, but reality in a past state: at 
once the past and the real” (Barthes 82). Fredric Jameson likewise argues that popular images 
represent the past, but Jameson focuses his attention on the fact that the past cannot be 
reobtained. Similarly, the feeling of nostalgia that one seeks when watching films or reading 
stories that reuse older plots is a somewhat Freudian desire to relive one’s childhood, so Jameson 
argues that nostalgia film—and, by extension, nostalgia art—reveals the individual’s inability to 
“focus [one’s] own present, as though [one has] become incapable of achieving aesthetic 
representations of [one’s] own current experience” (1853). One’s inability to accurately imitate 
the present—that is, the inability of representation to capture and convey perfect truth—creates a 
desire to return to the past. These efforts to return to the past through art and film are, however, 
futile: “we seem condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop images and 
stereotypes about that past, which itself remains forever out of reach” (Jameson 1853). Jameson 
warns that the stereotypes, idiosyncrasies, and eccentricities of popular, reproduced images not 
only fail to represent the present, but also fail to represent the past meaningfully. Thus, the third 
remove from truth, a reproduction of a representation of creation, cannot truthfully illustrate 
either the present or the past. 
Still, Barthes asserts that the past is important for the individual; he finds solace in a 
photograph of his mother at a young age, and this particular book serves as a testament to her 
memory through his analysis of the importance that an image of his mother as a little girl holds 
for him. Through photographs, he returns to the past and mourns again and again, reliving his 
mother’s death as he finds himself trapped in the place between what will be—her eventual 
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death—and what has been—her life (Barthes 96). Looking at a photograph generates an emotion 
other than love that Barthes does not disregard: pity (116). While some images do create an 
insatiable desire to return to an inauthentic past, Barthes stands firm in his assertion that the 
punctum, whether it generates nostalgia or sorrow, is vital to the viewer’s true understanding of 
the photograph, no matter how inaccurate that photograph may be. 
 More broadly, Barthes’s conclusions about portrait-photography also apply to 
representations that are painted or drawn. While the portrait or drawing provides less certainty 
than photography with regard to the truth of existence, the portraits that precede the advent of 
photography generally aim to provide an accurate representation of the subject, often for 
posterity. Barthes presents the art of representation as something that can be trusted to tell the 
truth—but only to a certain extent. Instead, the portrait-photograph, and, by extension, 
representation, should not only draw the attention of the viewer, but also encourage in the viewer 




1.2: PHOTOGRAPHY AS DIFFÉRANCE: FROM TRUTH TO BEAUTY 
 While Barthes looks at the effect of photography on the viewer in terms of animation, the 
studium, and the punctum, Susan Sontag, in her book On Photography, considers the nature of 
the photograph itself. She argues that the photograph emphasizes that which is beautiful over that 
which is true, writing that the “camera’s ability to transform reality into something beautiful 
derives from its relative weakness as a means of conveying truth” (Sontag 112). For Sontag, the 
issue of photography—or, at least, the issue the world has made of photography—is not with 
how accurate the representation is but with how beautiful the image is. This is strikingly different 
from the opinions of Plato and Benjamin, who bemoan the loss of authenticity in a 
representation. Barthes agrees with Sontag to some degree; he argues that photography can “lie 
as to the meaning of the thing . . . [but] never as to its existence” (Barthes 87). For Barthes, the 
truth of existence is enough, but Sontag heavily critiques the photograph’s failure to convey truth 
of meaning—and even its failure to convey the accuracy of existence. 
Although Sontag identifies the current focus of photography as beauty, that was not 
always the case: “The history of photography could be recapitulated as the struggle between two 
different imperatives: beautification, which comes from the fine arts, and truth-telling” (Sontag 
86). The seeming inability to satisfy both beauty and truth reveals that this world cannot 
reconcile the idea that something can be both beautiful and true.  
 Part of Sontag’s analysis of the photograph, therefore, is that of the relationship between 
beauty and representation. Though her analysis of the photograph does not explicitly focus on 
portrait-photography, she notes that “so successful has been the camera’s role in beautifying the 
world that photographs, rather than the world, have become the standard of the beautiful” 
(Sontag 85). According to Sontag’s theory, the world seems not to care if all it sees are shadows 
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on the wall of a cave as long as the shadows are photogenic. In the same way, people favor 
photogenic, idealized images of themselves over images that reflect how they typically look: 
“Many people are anxious when they’re about to be photographed . . . because they fear the 
camera’s disapproval. People want the idealized image: a photograph of themselves looking their 
best” (Sontag 85). The desire for an idealized image creates an unfair standard for portrait-
photography because people “feel rebuked when the camera doesn’t return an image of 
themselves as more attractive than they really are” (Sontag 85, emphasis added). In terms of the 
world, the beautiful is that which is photographed, but in terms of portrait-photography, the 
beautiful is that which is more beautiful than reality.  
 Sontag discusses the transition from truth-focused photography to beauty-focused 
photography by exploring the way in which a plurality of photographers has affected the art. 
Whereas early photography existed to create a perfect copy of the image, later photography has 
developed into a way for photographers to express themselves, each taking a different 
photograph even if they are photographing the same subject. As a result, photographers embrace 
the multiplicity of meanings their photographs can produce, and “the supposition that cameras 
furnish an impersonal, objective image yield[s] to the fact that photographs are evidence not only 
of what’s there but of what an individual sees, not just a record but an evaluation of the world” 
(Sontag 88). The photograph is a way for the photographer to create a visual poetry of images, a 
poem that, rather than being comprised by words and stanzas and rhyme scheme, makes do with 
subjects and spatial composition and symmetry. 
 If photographs have moved away from truth-telling, perhaps the aura of a photograph is 
more important than its authenticity. It was not until the technological reproduction of 
photographs gained popularity that “the cult of the future . . . alternates with the wish to return to 
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a more artisanal, purer past—when images still had a handmade quality, an aura” (Sontag 124). 
Despite the accuracy and clarity of digital images, Sontag suggests that Polaroid photographs 
still have a certain appeal to the pathos of an individual; they evoke a kind of nostalgia that 
cannot be found by looking at a picture reproduced from a negative or a monitor on a digital 
camera. Polaroids possess an aura because they “revive the principle of the daguerreotype 
camera: each print is a unique object” (Sontag 125). Polaroid photographs can only be created 
once, but photographs produced from negatives can be reproduced without compromising the 
quality of each reproduction. Furthermore, with digital photography, no physical, stable image 
exists, improving the quality of reproduction but removing the aura that exists at the creation of a 
single, unique object. In this way, photographs, which originally lack an aura due to their high 
level of reproducibility, can attain an aura as time passes—provided, of course, that they are 
prints and not just digital images. 
 As a result of technological reproducibility, it would seem that society is moving toward 
a future where the methodology and the aura, whether beautiful or not, are of great importance to 
the photograph; the memories and nostalgia evoked by photographs move to the forefront when 
truth and beauty fall away. One can see this in Barthes’s response to the picture of his mother he 
cherished so dearly: “I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. 
For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations of the 
‘ordinary’” (73). In a postmodern world where truth and beauty are subjective, perhaps aura and 
nostalgia are more important for viewers who long to have some sort of control, whether “an 
imaginary possession of a past that is unreal [or]…of space in which they are insecure” (Sontag 
19). This longing to possess the world through images is only possible if, and perhaps because, 
the present era, as philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach puts it, “prefers the image to the thing, the 
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copy to the original, the representation to the reality, appearance to being” (qtd. in Sontag 153). 
The privileged position of representation calls into question the importance of truth—and, by 
extension, how far one is removed from that truth. If illusion is privileged over truth, there must 
be another criterion for the evaluation of the relative importance of photography. 
 The implications of Feuerbach’s assertion are such that a photograph of an event is more 
important than the event itself. Sontag herself interprets the phenomenon of the privileging of 
representation differently, arguing that “photography does not simply reproduce the real, it 
recycles it . . . things and events are put to new uses, assigned new meanings, which go beyond 
the distinctions between the beautiful and the ugly, the true and the false, the useful and the 
useless, good taste and bad taste” (174). While photographs often act as substitutions for reality, 
they can also act as a new way for one to understand reality. At face value, it seems that Sontag’s 
assertion is modernist in nature; photography is simply a way of making reality new by recycling 
it. Photography goes beyond this, however; it ultimately acts to defer meaning by rejecting both 
the privileged and the unprivileged binary oppositions and embraces something akin to Barthes’s 
punctum: the “interesting” (Sontag 175). In a beautifully Derridean way, “cameras are the 
antidote and the disease, a means of appropriating reality and a means of making it obsolete” 
(Sontag 179). Cameras—and the representations they produce—defer a final judgment about the 
goodness of their nature. 
 Sontag’s analysis of photography can, like Barthes’s, be expanded to include the broader 
art of representation. Painted representations, too, struggle with the relationship between truth 
and beauty; some early instances of representation in literature, such as Oscar Wilde’s The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, address the struggle between appearance and reality. Painted 
representations carry with them a certain aura as well, and this aura evokes a desire not only for 
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past events but also for past technologies and simpler times. Although representations are not as 
convincing a substitute for reality as photographs, paintings and drawings still recycle reality—
perhaps more so than photographs since every painting or drawing necessarily makes the subject 
new. While painted representations are not in danger of making reality obsolete, they still act as 
both a poison and a cure, sometimes revealing a too-true—but perhaps, as Derrida would 





2: THE PORTRAIT IN LITERATURE 
 When considering the history of the motif of representations in literature, it is important 
to begin with drawn or painted portraits because they precede the advent of the photograph. 
Portraits afford the writer the ability to create an image that seems important by default. Barthes, 
referring to photographs, writes that “photography, in order to surprise, photographs the notable; 
but soon, by a familiar reversal, it decrees notable whatever it photographs” (34). Since it is true 
that most portraits were reserved for the wealthy individuals who could commission them, 
portraits follow this same developmental pattern as photographs. The portrait initially served to 
capture the essence of nobility or of the moneyed class, but today, artists create representations 
that instill in the viewer—and, by extension, the reader—a sense of nobility and wonder, whether 
such a sense existed before or not. Even though a portrait can imbue its subject with importance, 
a portrait lacks the conviction that its subject existed in precisely that form at some time in the 
past. Portraits do not provide evidence of existence; at best, they provide the evidence that a 
subject seems to exist.  
The representations that appear in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and Henry 
James’s “The Real Thing” introduce the conflict between idealized beauty and truth of character. 
In Wilde’s novel, the painted representation of Dorian Gray reveals more of his character than 
does his physical body, and representation, for this reason, is praised over Dorian’s deceptive 
appearance, decreeing that the picture is more notable than the man. In James’s short story, on 
the other hand, the Monarchs are, in fact, nobility, but it is their very nobility that prevents them 
from being represented. They are too true to themselves, which hinders their ability to represent 
characters in other times and places. While Wilde’s novel praises the representation as a means 
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by which truth can be revealed, James’s story introduces the idea that representation must not be 




2.1: THE SHADOW OF A PUPPET: THE DEATH OF THE IDEAL 
 Representations have a tendency to depict the idealized self—or, at the very least, to try 
to do so, per Sontag—but there is often a disparity between the idealized appearance and the 
idealized moral self. In The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde, a portrait of Dorian Gray, a 
beautiful youth, enables Dorian’s appearance to stay the same, frozen in time, while the portrait 
changes, ages, and reflects Dorian’s increasing moral depravity. The difference between the 
appearance of Dorian and the reality of his soul, as illustrated by himself and his picture, 
respectively, mocks the societal desire for the idealized appearance and emphasizes the 
significance of the true, inner self. 
 Dorian exists in three distinct states: the innocent youth, the blameless sinner, and the 
repentant murderer. In his time of innocence and his time of repentance, his outer appearance 
and his inner appearance correspond. Throughout most of the novel, however, Dorian exists in a 
state of contradiction; he sins without ceasing, but he still appears perfectly blameless. In one 
encounter with James Vane, the vengeful brother of Dorian’s previous love interest who 
committed suicide after Dorian broke her heart, Dorian relies on the disparity between his 
outward appearance and his inward appearance, arguing that he could not have been Sybil’s love 
because he still appeared young, much too young to have engaged in a relationship with Sybil: 
“the face of the man [James] had sought to kill had all the bloom of boyhood, all the unstained 
purity of youth. He seemed little more than a lad of twenty summers, hardly older, if older 
indeed at all, than his sister had been when they had parted so many years ago. It was obvious 
that this was not the man who had destroyed her life” (Wilde 161). Dorian uses the fact that he 
cannot age or change as an excuse to do as he pleases, pursuing reckless pleasure over inner 
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edification. The picture protects and enables him, and he uses the picture to his full advantage 
during this time of sin and debauchery. 
 Before this time of sin, however, Dorian appears to be innocent in nature. Dorian’s 
appearance is beautiful and inviting, betraying no hint of his eventual moral decline and demise. 
Upon meeting Dorian, Lord Henry Wotton, a friend of Basil Hallward, the painter who paints 
Dorian’s picture, remarks that Dorian “was certainly wonderfully handsome, with his finely-
curved scarlet lips, his frank blue eyes, his crisp gold hair. There was something in his face that 
made one trust him at once. All the candour of youth was there, as well as all youth’s passionate 
purity. One felt that he had kept himself unspotted from the world” (Wilde 17). At this point, 
Lord Henry’s remarks about Dorian are true; Dorian is innocent, if unenlightened.  
It is clear from the beginning of the novel that Dorian’s life will not remain as innocent as 
it has been. Basil engages in foreshadowing when he comments that Dorian’s present gain, his 
good looks and youth, will cause Dorian to “suffer for what the gods have given [him], suffer 
terribly” (Wilde 7). Dorian does indeed suffer, for, while he retains his good looks throughout 
the whole novel, excepting the last page, his innocence becomes an illusion, and he is burdened 
with the fear that his picture could be discovered and destroy his illusory innocence. Basil later 
comments, unknowingly ironically, that Dorian seems to capture the “harmony of soul and 
body” (Wilde 13) that Dorian’s picture later throws into discord. Author Michael Davis writes of 
the relationship between Dorian’s mind and body in his article “Mind and Matter in The Picture 
of Dorian Gray,” in which Davis suggests that “the atoms of the painting, like the human mind, 
take on an ambiguous relationship to the material world” (548), and it is this division of the 
painting and mind from Dorian’s body that allow the painting to reveal truth even when the 
material world deceives those who see Dorian. 
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 The beginning of Dorian’s enlightenment is not, however, necessarily the point of his 
ruination. Lord Henry influences Dorian—and he is an immoral influence, as Lord Henry 
himself asserts. Dorian is “dimly conscious that entirely fresh influences [are] at work within 
him. Yet they seemed to him to have come really from himself” (Wilde 18). Even though Dorian 
believes that these new influences are his own, the words of Lord Henry certainly act as a 
catalyst or impetus for Dorian’s enlightenment. At this point, Dorian has still committed no 
immoral acts, and Basil remarks that Lord Henry’s words have created on Dorian’s face “the 
most wonderful expression” (Wilde 20), an expression that Basil replicates in his portrait. Lord 
Henry agrees, saying that Dorian’s success in sitting for Basil is “entirely due to [Lord Henry]” 
(24). The influence that Lord Henry holds over Dorian’s demeanor is clear, but Lord Henry’s 
immoral influence is not yet at work in Dorian’s life. 
 A much more poignant moment of enlightenment occurs when Dorian sees the painting 
face-to-face. Barthes understands the portrait-photograph as the “advent of [himself] as other” 
(12), and this same concept applies to Dorian’s relationship with his portrait. When Dorian 
approaches the painting, “a look of joy [comes] into his eyes, as if he . . . recognize[s] himself for 
the first time” (24). He recognizes his beauty, but he also recognizes his mortality, for he knows 
that he “shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will always remain young. It 
will never be older than this particular day of June” (25). Dorian, in truly seeing a representation 
of himself, understands himself to be the other and comes to a form of consciousness, one in 
which he can be recognized as a person, according to Hegel’s social construct theory (Hegel 
543). Hegel suggests that the self needs to recognize that which is other than the self in order to 
attain consciousness, and Dorian’s portrait acts as the other. Although Dorian does not 
comprehend it, at this moment of recognition, he engages in a “life-and-death struggle” with his 
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other self, his picture, in order to “attain . . . to the truth of this recognition as an independent 
self-consciousness” (Hegel 543). Dorian is given the gift of consciousness—the ability to 
recognize his own beauty—when he encounters his portrait, but that same gift is, as Basil 
predicts, his downfall because it involves him in a lifelong struggle for selfhood that is 
independent of his portrait, a struggle that Dorian wins, but only in death. 
Later in the novel, however, Dorian’s face retains its same appearance of youth, sense of 
trustworthiness, and essence of purity. Dorian, via the influence of Lord Henry, believes that “the 
search for beauty [is] the real secret of life” (Wilde 43). Lord Henry’s influence is further exerted 
over Dorian in the form of a book that he sends to Dorian. The book contains messages of 
hedonism and decadence, and “[f]or years, Dorian Gray could not free himself from the 
influence of this book. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he never sought to free 
himself from it” (Wilde 108). Dorian became increasingly willing to engage in evil in order to 
satisfy his desires. Critic Minodora Simion, in her article “A New Hedonism in Oscar Wilde’s 
Novel The Picture of Dorian Gray,” writes that “vice and evil become means of experiencing 
intense sensual and aesthetic pleasure for Dorian” (57); thus, the morality of Dorian’s means do 
not matter to him as long as his pleasurable ends are attained. Just as Dorian was chained by his 
knowledge that the portrait changed to reflect his growing immorality, he was chained by the 
influence of deplorable ideas and people, but he does not attempt to escape the influence of the 
picture or of Lord Henry. Even though impure, immoral ideas entered Dorian’s mind, “he had 
always the look of one who had kept himself unspotted from the world” (Wilde 108). Dorian was 




Those around Dorian attempt to reconcile his innocent appearance with the rumors of his 
moral depravity, but his appearance triumphs over the rumors and persuades them of his 
blameless purity: “Even those who had heard the most evil things against him, and from time to 
time strange rumours about his mode of life crept through London and became the chatter of the 
clubs, could not believe anything to his dishonour when they saw him” (Wilde 108). Society 
privileges Dorian’s appearance over his inner moral depravity. Others seem to forget that 
Dorian’s appearance is, as Nietzsche puts it, an illusion—albeit a very convincing one—and do 
not seek the deeper truth of Dorian’s inner character.  
Basil, who has known Dorian for years, also falls prey to the deception of Dorian’s 
appearance, saying, “I don’t believe those rumours at all. At least, I can’t believe them when I 
see you. Sin is a thing that writes itself across a man’s face. It cannot be concealed” (Wilde 127). 
Basil confirms that the innocence that used to be painted across Dorian’s face is the same 
innocence that still abides there. Basil keeps in his mind the idealized form of Dorian that he 
once knew, the one for whom he felt some “curious artistic idolatry” (Wilde 13). For Basil, the 
picture of Dorian Gray replaces the person of Dorian Gray. Dorian himself remarks that Basil 
“like[s] [his] art better than [his] friends” (Wilde 25), and Lord Henry agrees, knowing that Basil 
privileges the idealized appearance of Dorian over the reality of his inner being: “Some day you 
will look at your friend, and he will seem to you to be a little out of drawing, or you won’t like 
his tone of colour, or something” (Wilde 14). This echoes Feuerbach’s claims that the modern 
era privileges the representation over reality (Sontag 153); Basil certainly illustrates Feuerbach’s 
assertion about the inevitable, but perhaps unintentional, delusion of the present age. 
Indeed, Basil idealizes Dorian. Lord Harry remarks on this relationship between Basil’s 
art and the presence of Dorian: “his painting had quite gone off. It seemed to me to have lost 
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something. It had lost an ideal. When you and he ceased to be great friends, he ceased to be a 
great artist” (Wilde 180). Significantly, Basil’s idealization of Dorian led to the fulfillment of 
Basil’s prediction at the beginning of the novel: that he would suffer because of his art, and that 
Dorian would suffer because of his beauty. Furthermore, when Basil is confronted with the 
mutation of his idealized portrait, Basil is horrified. Dorian asks ironically, “Can’t you see your 
ideal in it?” (Wilde 132) when he knows that Basil cannot. Even though Basil can still see his 
signature on the painting, he calls the portrait a “foul parody, some infamous, ignoble satire” 
(Wilde 131). The parody of Dorian’s portrait, however, still holds meaning because parody, 
according to Jameson, intends to mock (Jameson 1849). The mockery of Basil’s original painting 
still holds meaning for Dorian, eventually convicting him to repent of his moral corruption. 
The portrait reveals the truth—more truth than Dorian himself ever could. When Basil 
realizes that Dorian’s face is an illusion of purity, he is confronted by the true face of Dorian’s 
soul (132). Basil has lost his ideal—he has woken up outside of Plato’s cave and realizes that the 
Dorian he thought he knew and idealized is instead nothing more than a shadow of a puppet. In 
Plato’s cave, the prisoners see only the shadows of puppets cast by a fire and believe them to be 
true, but Basil’s painting frees Basil from belief in the illusion of Dorian Gray’s perfection. 
Dorian’s portrait is the central element of the story, but more central to the larger story of 
the motif of representation and photography is the idea that representation did once convey truth. 
Dorian’s portrait exists as a counterbalance to his appearance, and while his appearance 
deceives, his portrait conveys truth. Even though Basil privileges the representation over reality, 
the fate of Dorian suggests that truth should be valued over beauty. While Wilde uses the book 
only as a means to suggest that “all excess, as well as all renunciation, brings its own 
punishment” (qtd. in Bristow xxii), one of these excesses is the excess of beauty, and an excess 
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of the pursuit of beauty certainly compromises Dorian’s—and Basil’s—ability to see and 
understand the truth. Dorian’s portrait is removed twice from truth—it is a representation of 
Dorian, who is himself a representation of the ideal Form—but in other ways, the portrait is 




2.2: THE INEFFICACY OF THE IDEAL: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF REALITY AND 
REPRESENTATION 
 In The Picture of Dorian Gray, the reader is warned against believing an idealized image; 
in “The Real Thing,” by Henry James, the idealized image is presented as true—or, at least, once 
true—but ultimately useless. The narrator, a painter, uses sitters as illustrations for books and 
advertisements, and he is one day met by sitters who have fallen from the good graces of 
nobility. They were the “real” thing; they once were the nobles he is trying to capture in his 
pictures. The narrator cannot use them for his illustrations, however, because he cannot make 
them into the characters he intends for them to represent. The truth of their nobility, therefore, 
does not lend them to representation. In this case, the real is too real for its own good, and the 
sitters fail because they are too true to be represented. 
 The sitters, the Major and Mrs. Monarch, were once beautiful and noble, but after falling 
on hard times, they convey not a sense of beauty and brilliance, but of faded glory. The pair look 
distinguished when they first arrive at the narrator’s studio, but the narrator quickly notes that 
Mrs. Monarch has the “effect of a moist sponge passed over a ‘sunk’ piece of painting, as well as 
of a vague allusion to vanished beauty” (James 1533). There is an unavoidable sense that the 
Monarchs have lost some of the beauty and nobility they once possessed, and this inconvenient 
truth is illustrated when the narrator draws them; he can only draw them as they are. His attempts 
to portray Mrs. Monarch inevitably result in drawings that “looked like a photograph or a copy 
of a photograph . . . . She was the real thing, but always the same thing” (James 1541). Though 
still a lady, Mrs. Monarch was only herself and could be nothing more than herself. 
 Where the truth in other situations is preferable, the narrator bemoans Mrs. Monarch’s 
inability to be drawn. He notes that “the very habit [motionlessness] that made her good for that 
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purpose [being photographed] unfitted her for [being drawn]” (James 1541). Photography, 
which, as both Barthes and Sontag note, provides evidence of existence, was the correct art form 
for representing Mrs. Monarch. The narrator’s drawings failed as illustrations because his 
reproduction of her was too accurate for a drawing. Charles Johanningsmeier, professor of 
English and author of “How Real American Readers Originally Experienced James’s The Real 
Thing,” suggests that “true realistic art cannot simply copy reality-it must transform reality with 
the power of the artist’s sensibility” (78). This reflects Sontag’s idea that art recycles reality; by 
simply producing a too-realistic drawing of reality, the narrator fails to create art. Sontag further 
notes that photography freed art to use abstraction, and the abstractions that make art unique are 
impossible when only the literal truth, the real thing, can be conveyed (94). 
 Indeed, the main issue for the Monarchs is that they find themselves as the real thing in a 
world that has decided to privilege representation over truth. As Feuerbach asserts, society has 
begun to privilege the representation over reality. This is true in the case of the narrator: “But 
somehow with all their perfections I didn’t easily believe in them . . . . Combined with this was 
another perversity—an innate preference for the represented subject over the real one: the defect 
of the real one was so apt to be a lack of representation” (James 1537). The fault of the Monarchs 
is that they have no faults; they are too perfect in nobility and carriage to be anything but 
themselves, but in a world where they have fallen from nobility, they must learn to be something 
which they are not. Ian Bell, professor of English and an expert on Henry James, suggests that 
“the aura of authenticity conferred by the adjectival ‘real’ compounds these qualities towards, in 
the end, absolute immutability” (228). It is only through rejecting this immutability that the 
Monarchs can learn to embrace new selves, or new representations of selves, in order to survive 
in a world that favors representation over reality. 
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On the other hand, the narrator’s prized models, Miss Churm and Oronte, neither of 
whom have any claims to nobility, can act any part put before them. The narrator can make them 
into the ideal which he sees in his mind, but he can do nothing with the images of Major and 
Mrs. Monarch. In contrast with Mrs. Monarch, who can only be “always the same thing” (1541), 
Miss Churm “could represent everything” (James 1539), and, even though the Major was an 
actual English gentleman, the narrator chooses to use Oronte, a man searching for money in 
England who happened upon the narrator’s studio by chance, as his model for an English 
gentleman. 
 When the Monarchs realize that they are unsuited to sitting for the narrator’s drawings, 
they take on the roles of servants, completing their fall from nobility by performing their new 
identities. Even though they try to delay the inevitable by acting as nobility, their failure in this 
endeavor reveals their new identities: that of servants. The Monarchs, in this moment, finally 
understand “the perverse and cruel law in virtue of which the real thing could be so much less 
precious than the unreal . . . . If [the narrator’s] servants were [his] models, then [his] models 
might be [his] servants” (1549). This role reversal illustrates the deconstruction of reality and 
representation. Truth is no longer privileged over illusion, and reality is no longer privileged over 
representation, rendering the difference between appearance and being meaningless. 
 In this story, once again, representation is preferred over reality, but the reversal at the 
end of the story does not re-elevate the Monarchs to a position of authority simply as a result of 
their having been noble. The narrator’s drawings of the Monarchs cannot be reproduced in a 
fictional work because the drawings convey truth instead of stimulating the imagination of the 
characters who read those books. Though the Monarchs’ images would be removed from the 
truth three times—once in creation, once in representation, and once in reproduction—the 
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images would convey truth in a time that preferred representation over reality. While the reversal 
at the end of The Picture of Dorian Gray corrects the disparity between appearance and being, 
the reversal at the end of “The Real Thing” simply solidifies the social preference for 




3: THE PHOTOGRAPH IN LITERATURE 
 From the invention of the daguerreotype, the ability to produce and reproduce a portrait 
identical to the original subject has captured the imaginations of almost all artists, including 
writers. When considering the motif of the photograph in literature, however, it can be difficult 
to understand how to analyze visual elements of the photograph, such as the studium and the 
punctum, when one cannot see the image in question. In short, the reader must depend on the 
narrator to provide the elements necessary for a proper evaluation of the effect of the photograph 
on the characters in the novel. 
 Once again, one must consider whether the representation—in this case, the 
photograph—relies on beauty or truth, or if it subverts the two altogether and makes its own 
meaning for itself in the recycling of reality or in the nostalgia it conveys. Another element that 
is introduced to the study of the photograph is that of technological reproducibility, an issue that 
grows and is eventually satirized in the texts under consideration. From the simple representation 
of the daguerreotype in Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables to the idealization of 
reproduced photographs in Hardy’s Jude the Obscure and Robert Penn Warren’s All the Kings 
Men to the oversaturation of reproduced images in DeLillo’s White Noise, the photograph 
challenges the relative importance of the ideal, of truth, and of beauty. While the photograph 
entertains the question of truth-telling less than the portrait does, questions of truth and beauty in 
representation remain, leading to a much larger question in the postmodern era: does the 




3.1: THE BURDEN OF PROOF: REPRESENTATION AS TRUTH 
 Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables provides an interesting 
counterpoint to Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray. While Dorian is cursed by a painted portrait 
that knows too well his own character, the daguerreotypes of Hawthorne’s characters reveal their 
true characters. Although Barthes and Sontag argue that technological reproductions such as 
photographs necessarily communicate only truth of existence and not the truth of meaning, 
Holgrave, Hawthorne’s daguerreotypist, manages to wrest from his work the same truth of inner 
being that Basil Hallward does in his painting of Dorian. In Hawthorne’s novel, the technological 
representation created by the daguerreotype does not hinder the truth but validates it.  
 The main conflict of Hawthorne’s novel involves the struggle for the ownership of the 
House of the Seven Gables. Hepzibah, an older woman who lives in and has claim to the house, 
takes in her cousin Phoebe and, later, Hepzibah’s brother Clifford, after he has been released 
from jail. Their struggle is against Judge Pyncheon, a man who appears kind and friendly, but 
who suffers from the same depravity of spirit as does Dorian. The importance of ancestry 
throughout the novel—Phoebe’s identity as a Pyncheon, Holgrave’s position as a Maule, against 
whom the Pyncheons have struggled for years over land—reverberates in the person of Judge 
Pyncheon and his role as a representation of his ancestor, Colonel Pyncheon. Hepzibah notes the 
similarity between the two, asserting that “never did a man show stronger proof of the lineage 
attributed to him, than Judge Pyncheon, at this crisis, by his unmistakeable resemblance to the 
picture [of Colonel Pyncheon] in the inner room” (Hawthorne 232).  
The similarities between Judge Pyncheon and Colonel Pyncheon exist not only in body 
but also in spirit. The narrator notes that Colonel Pyncheon “had been greedy of wealth; the 
Judge, too, with all the show of liberal expenditure, was said to be as close-fisted as if his gripe 
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were of iron. The ancestor had clothed himself in a grim assumption of kindliness . . . . His 
descendant . . . had etherealized this rude benevolence into that broad benignity of smile” 
(Hawthorne 122). Judge Pyncheon is a representation of Colonel Pyncheon in life and in death, 
dying in the same chair beneath the same portrait of the Colonel. 
 The representation of Judge Pyncheon reveals more truth than does the Judge’s actual 
appearance. While the Judge appears honorable to the general populace of the town, he hides a 
secret that he, in his youth, framed Clifford for a murder that Clifford did not commit 
(Hawthorne 310). Alan Trachtenberg, professor of English and an expert in the field of American 
Studies, asserts that the citizens of the town are “eager to trust the facades projected in images of 
men holding public trust” (469), so they trusted in the face of Judge Pyncheon, believing his 
appearance because there was nothing else for them to believe. Early in the novel, however, 
Holgrave shows a miniature of the Judge to Phoebe, and this miniature “actually brings out the 
secret character with a truth that no painter would ever venture upon, even could he detect it” 
(Hawthorne 91). Phoebe incorrectly identifies the Colonel as subject of the miniature, 
recognizing the Colonel from his portrait in the house. Trachtenberg further notes that 
“photographers offered their goods as a social good, a guide to virtue . . . . For was not character 
readily discernible in the face? And did not the daguerreotype provide the republic with its most 
fool-proof means of discerning character?” (469). The question that emerges, then, is how to 
reconcile the difference in Judge Pyncheon’s face and in the representation of his face created by 
Holgrave’s miniature.  
When Phoebe incorrectly identifies the subject of the daguerreotype, she unintentionally 
reaffirms the similarities between the Judge and the Colonel. Holgrave explains the actual 
subject to her, saying that “the original [the Judge] wears, to the world’s eye . . . an exceedingly 
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pleasant countenance  . . . . The sun . . . tells quite another story, and will not be coaxed out of it, 
after half-a-dozen patient attempts on [Holgrave’s] part” (Hawthorne 92). Holgrave’s persistence 
betrays the accuracy of the daguerreotype; though it is not the image that Holgrave expects, it is, 
undeniably, the truth. Barthes and Sontag argue that photographs have strayed far away from 
conveying any sort of truth of meaning, but Holgrave’s daguerreotypes, unfailingly, reveal the 
truth of Judge Pyncheon’s character. 
After Judge Pyncheon’s death, Holgrave makes another miniature of the Judge, showing 
it to Phoebe to communicate the reality of the Judge’s death. Miniatures are used once again to 
promote truth and validity instead of beauty. Holgrave uses the miniatures to document the death 
of Judge Pyncheon, calling the image “a point of evidence that may be useful to Clifford—and 
also as a memorial valuable to [himself]” (Hawthorne 303). Through representation, Holgrave 
documents the truth of the Judge’s death and reveals this truth to Phoebe. 
In Hawthorne’s and Wilde’s novels, the representers, Holgrave and Basil respectively, 
attempt to capture beauty of appearance but unintentionally capture truth of being. The spirits of 
Judge Pyncheon and Dorian, invisible to the naked eye, are morally depraved, and their sins 
shine through in miniatures and portraits alike. Holgrave’s daguerreotypes, however, provide a 
case for the Judge’s true character because they repeatedly offered the same results. Despite all 
of Holgrave’s miniatures of the Judge, each one showed with certainty the reality of the Judge’s 
inner being and his own role as a representation of the Colonel. While representations in 
literature do not always convey the truth of appearance or existence, they sometimes convey the 




3.2: AUTHENTICITY IN REPRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN 
CREATING AUTHENTIC LOVE 
In The House of the Seven Gables, daguerreotypes are used to communicate the reality of 
present events, but photographs also allow individuals to bring the past into the present, to 
remember, by looking at a static image, how life used to be. Photographs, however, can also 
encourage individuals to misremember and idealize the past. In Thomas Hardy’s Jude the 
Obscure, Jude struggles to understand the relationship between his idealized version of the 
present and the truth of reality. His lofty dreams are consistently crushed under the harsh foot of 
reality, whether in the form of a wife who leaves him, colleges that reject him, or a lover who 
refuses to wed him. With regard to his relationship with his lover Sue, however, his idealization 
of Sue’s various portraits, mere representations of Sue herself, leads him to find unshakeable 
beauty in the original. Jude idealizes necessarily imperfect reproductions of Sue, and, even 
though Jude superimposes this inauthentic ideal over Sue, Jude and Sue create authenticity in 
love, making their separation all the more powerful. 
 Jude’s admiration of Sue’s portrait creates an unhealthy ideal that Sue cannot possibly 
embody. His first introduction to Sue is not to Sue herself; rather, he learns of her existence first 
through a photograph: “One day . . . [he] had observed between the brass candlesticks on [his 
aunt’s] mantelpiece the photograph of a pretty girlish face, in a broad hat with radiating folds 
under the brim like the rays of a halo” (Hardy 54). Jude sees her as an angel, a being that 
rightfully belongs on the mantel, the center of the home. He first notices the portrait of Sue after 
his idealized hopes of a future with his wife Arabella have been crushed. Arabella leaves for 
Australia, leaving behind a portrait of Jude that he had given her as a gift on their wedding day. 
Arabella’s thoughtless action destroys whatever love Jude had felt for Arabella: “The utter death 
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of every tender sentiment in his wife, as brought home to him by this mute and undersigned 
evidence of her sale of his portrait and gift, was the conclusive little stroke required to demolish 
all sentiment in him” (Hardy 51). When Jude purges the memory of Arabella from his heart, he 
gives Sue the opportunity to step in as his beloved, and she does, however unintentionally. In 
fact, when Jude’s aunt finally confers the photograph on him, he puts it on the mantelpiece of his 
own room, placing this idealized, angelic Sue literally at the center of his house and figuratively 
at the center of his heart.  
 Jude’s idealization of Sue is perpetuated by the fact that he continues to admire her 
likeness without getting to know Sue as a person. He catches glimpses of Sue from afar, but he 
never engages in conversation with her; instead, he “[keeps] watch over her . . . . The 
consciousness of her living presence stimulate[s] him. But she remain[s] more or less an ideal 
character, about whose form he [begins] to weave curious and fantastic day-dreams” (Hardy 63). 
Jude, far from worshiping Sue as she is, worships an ideal form of her that he creates. Even when 
Jude recognizes that his perception of Sue is likely inaccurate, he is unable to free himself from 
his misconceptions. He ruminates that “[p]erhaps to know her would be to cure himself of this 
unexpected and unauthorized passion . . . [but] that, though he desire[s] to know her, he [does] 
not desire to be cured” (Hardy 70). Jude, in the context of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” is one 
who sees the light of the sun and intentionally returns to the cave. He continues studying the 
shadows—Sue’s portrait—which represents appearance rather than truth (Republic 67). Jude 
intentionally perpetuates his idealization of Sue, knowing that the truth about Sue could shatter 
this ideal. 
 Sue herself does not try to cure Jude of his passion; instead, she encourages him in his 
love. Although Sue pleads innocence, claiming that she “didn’t see what [Jude] felt at all” 
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(Hardy 116), she permits his love, writing that if he wants to love her, he may, and she’ll “never 
say again that [he] musn’t!” (Hardy 114). Sue’s letters to Jude paint a second portrait of her, a 
picture of her personality that she can revise and edit before she seals it in an envelope and sends 
it off. Jude realizes that Sue is “often not so nice in [her] real presence as [she is] in [her] letters” 
(Hardy 121). Despite her inconstancy, Jude continues to love Sue for who he believes her to be. 
He continues to see her as the haloed, angelic figure that he saw when he first noticed her 
portrait. Even in person, when she is ill and helpless, he “[sees] in her almost a divinity” (Hardy 
106). Michael Steig notes that Jude’s actions reveal “the tendency of Victorian men to idealize 
women and feel far beneath them” (263); Jude’s idealization of Sue coexists with his self-
degradation, and he puts up with her inconstancy in part because of his own insecurities. Jude, 
therefore, keeps himself from being cured of his passion for Sue by focusing on the divine 
qualities of her portrait, her written sentiments, and her sickly form, choosing to look past her 
changeable heart. 
Sue reinforces this ideal by giving an additional portrait to Jude, one that he accepts 
gladly. Sue’s portrait, however, is not like the carefully taken and framed photograph that Jude 
gave to Arabella to declare his love for and commitment to her. Instead, it is a copied photograph 
that she nearly forgets to give to him (Hardy 101). She also gives a duplicate of the photograph 
to Phillotson, and she “would have given [it] to any man” (Hardy 119). Like Jude, Phillotson 
reveres Sue’s image, almost kissing it, which Jude actually does (Hardy 60). In his discussion of 
technologically reproduced photographs, Walter Benjamin asserts that the duplication of any 
photograph distances it from the true aura and meaning of the original photograph. In this case, 
the photograph of Sue, which is already an idealized and incomplete representation of Sue 
herself, loses authenticity of meaning through reproduction. Indeed, multiple replications of the 
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original liquidate any unique value or authenticity of the reproduction that Sue gives to Jude. 
Even though such a reproduction allows Jude to carry Sue with him when she is physically 
absent, the mass creation and distribution of her portrait cheapens the copy she gives to Jude, and 
“one thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art—its unique existence in a particular 
place” (Benjamin 1053). Sue does not fully commit to Jude in the here and now, as seen by her 
hesitation to wed him, but she is more than willing to give him a reproduction of her likeness that 
he is more than willing to idealize. 
In another example of her casual commitment to Jude, Sue does not cherish only Jude’s 
photograph. When he catches sight of her “looking at a photograph . . . [and] press[ing] it against 
her bosom” (Hardy 153), Jude admits to himself that Sue possesses other photographs, but he 
assures himself that she was looking at his. This serves to further prove Jude’s selective vision; 
he interprets Sue’s actions with the understanding that her love for him is constant even though 
he knows her to be changeable. In actuality, Sue cherishes the photographs and memories of Mr. 
Phillotson and her undergraduate friend, putting their pictures on display in her room at the 
training school. Ultimately, she returns to Phillotson despite her love for Jude, a return that is 
foreshadowed by the prominence of Phillotson’s photograph in her life, just as Jude’s continued 
love for her is predicted by the position of prominence in which Jude puts her photograph. 
Despite Sue’s return to Phillotson and her physical sacrifices to prove her love for him, 
Jude continues to love Sue. Jude clings tightly to the idea that he and Sue are “man and wife, if 
ever two people were in this world” (Hardy 265). Even though their marriage was not ratified by 
the church or state, Jude believes that their marriage was a real marriage, one not cheapened by 
adhering to traditions that have been replicated so often that they have lost their meaning. 
Significantly, Arabella recognizes Jude and Sue’s union as authentic—more authentic than her 
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union with Jude and also more authentic than Sue’s reunion with Phillotson, which was 
motivated by the guilt Sue feels for leaving him for Jude in the first place. Arabella suggests that 
Sue also continues to love Jude: “[Sue’s] never found peace since she left [Jude’s] arms, and 
never will again till she’s as he is now!” (Hardy 310). At Jude’s death, Sue and Jude are 
separated irrevocably, but the authenticity of their love for each other persists and cannot be 
replicated by their intimate relationships with Phillotson and Arabella respectively. 
Jude’s idealization of Sue, therefore, should not necessarily be condemned as an act of 
blind love but should perhaps be praised as an act of true love. Although Jude’s near idolatry of 
Sue’s photograph—a reproduced representation of the original person—creates an impossible 
ideal for her, he continues to see her through the eyes of love despite her inconstancy and 
failings. His love for Sue and her love for him grow into a love that is truly authentic and does 
not need to be ratified by any spiritual or political authority. Authenticity, it would seem, can 





3.3: FINDING MEANING IN MOTION: THE JUXTAPOSITION OF THE PAST AND 
THE PRESENT THROUGH PHOTOGRAPHY 
Even though there is a danger of idealizing the past, as Jude the Obscure reveals, the 
passage of time is inevitable, and individuals often take photographs so that they can remember 
the past as it was. The past cannot be fully captured in a photograph, however, and time does not 
stop simply because a single moment of time has been isolated and framed within the confines of 
a photograph. Outside of the frame, time continues to pass, and the colors that were so bright and 
vivid in a photograph become faded, reminding one that one’s memories of the past are ideals 
that cannot be reobtained. Whereas Hardy’s novel focuses on Jude’s failed attempts to attain an 
ideal, Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men warns against the idealization of the past. The 
novel details Willie Talos’s political campaign for governor from the perspective of Jack Burden, 
who interweaves past and present narratives, creating a sense that the past is invaluable to the 
present but ultimately unattainable. Fading colors are juxtaposed against static images of the 
past, revealing the inevitable passage of time and the insufficiency of photographs to capture the 
most important aspect of modern life: motion. 
 Throughout Warren’s novel, fading colors show the inevitable passage of time and speak 
to humanity’s inability to halt time. Several items in the novel are described as once-white, 
faded, or weathered, and these descriptors indicate that the past is not isolated from the present. 
Instead, these once-bright objects have passed through time and are still being used in the 
present. For example, the curtains in Old Man Talos’s house are “one-time white but now 
yellowish lace curtains” (Warren 36). The curtains have yellowed because of the “slow swell of 
Time which had fed into [the] room” (Warren 37). Time’s passage is slow, constant, and 
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inevitable, and neither the room nor the persons who have lived in that room could escape from 
the passing of time.   
 On the other hand, photographs act as a memorial to the past, a way for humanity to cling 
to the past in a time of inevitable change. Photographs are intended to capture life as it is but 
ultimately unearth the differences between the ideal past and the real present. The picture of 
Willie that hangs in the drug store serves to popularize Willie and to serve as a representation of 
him when he is not present. Even so, the photograph is inaccurate and “don’t do [Willie] no 
credit” (Warren 10), proving that it is an imperfect representation of him. Despite this imperfect 
representation, the citizenry still recognizes Willie when he comes to visit, but the real person is 
privileged over the representation, unlike Feuerbach’s assertion. 
 Another photograph, Lucy and Willie’s wedding picture, emphasizes the difference 
between the past and the present and reinforces the concept that change is inevitable. Jack 
suggests that Lucy “could think about all that had happened since she was a girl teaching her first 
year…and had married a red-faced and red-necked farm boy . . . (you can look at the wedding 
picture which has been in the papers along with a thousand other pictures of Willie) . . . . She 
would have had a lot to think about . . . for there had been a lot of changes” (Warren 6). Jack 
mentions the wedding photograph as a point of comparison with the present. The wedding 
picture is only a reproduction of a single moment of reality, but it is an effective visual tool for 
Lucy to identify the differences between the day of her wedding to a “red-necked farm boy” (6) 
and the years of Willie’s political campaigns. 
 Photographs do not only affect how one understands the relationship between the past 
and the present, but they also affect how future generations will think about the present. The 
staged photographs at Old Man Talos’s house reveal both the inaccuracy of photography as a 
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means of capturing the present and the frequency with which photographs are used to portray 
reality to posterity. The photograph of Willie outside of Old Man Talos’s house is staged to 
create an inaccurate image of a man with man’s best friend for campaigning purposes. The 
photographer wants Buck, the dog, in the shot even though the dog refuses to move. Jack’s 
vague job description apparently includes “lift[ing] up fifteen-year-old, hundred-and-thirty-five-
pound hairy, white dogs on summer afternoons and paint[ing] an expression of unutterable bliss 
upon their faithful features as they gaze deep, deep into the Boss’s eyes” (Warren 39). Jonathan 
Cullick, a professor of English who has written extensively about Robert Penn Warren, asserts 
that there is a difference between the image Willie hopes to convey and the reality of his 
character, and that this scene “amusingly emphasizes the division between [Willie’s] character 
and the representations of his character that he would impose into history” (61). Jack and the 
photographer, therefore, create a scene that is untrue in order to elicit an emotional response 
from those who see the photograph. This photograph, therefore, captures a staged, inaccurate 
version of the present that contrasts with the reality of the present. 
This inaccuracy is significant because it shapes the way future generations will 
understand and interpret the past. The photographs taken at Old Man Talos’s house are 
“documents for posterity” (Warren 42), but the imperfections of the photographs ensure that 
reality is not immortalized. Instead, an imperfect representation of reality is immortalized and 
popularized as reality. Cullick further suggests that “there is no representation without 
interpretation—there is no recollection without revision” (59). This echoes Sontag’s sentiment 
that photography recycles reality; no matter how accurate a representation may be, interpretation 
and revision are still necessary in order to make meaning of a representation. Sometimes, 
however, clever marketing removes one’s ability to correctly interpret a representation. Just as 
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the newspaper readers saw a static, carefully staged portrait of Willie and Lucy’s wedding, the 
future viewers of these photographs will see only an imperfect representation of Willie, Buck, 
and Willie’s childhood home but will be able to assume only that the photograph with which 
they have been presented is a true representation of reality. 
 Both the fading colors and the imperfect photographs reinforce Jack’s assertion that 
change is inevitable and necessary for life. Jack contends that “Life is Motion” (Warren 214); the 
fading colors show the constant passage of time, and the photographs serve as a point of 
comparison between the past and the present, illuminating the differences between the two and 
revealing how much has changed. In addition, Jack warns against the blind acceptance of 
purported truth by continuing that “Life is Motion toward Knowledge” (214). This modern 
journey of finding meaning is a process, and it is impossible for an unchanging image to 
perfectly represent the complexities of the present to posterity. Joseph Millichap, an expert on 
Robert Penn Warren and in photography, notes that “on the one hand, [photographs] represent 
fixed moments in time, stopped in the motion of history. On the other hand, they are part of the 
flux of history . . . . they both reflect and distort reality at once” (151). This is similar to Sontag’s 
discussion of photography as both a poison and a cure, “appropriating reality and a means of 
making it obsolete” (179). The photographs of Willie create a new reality that should ultimately 
prevent the viewers of the photographs from believing that such a staged reality would ever be 
authentic. Rather, the photographs should serve as useful tools for illuminating the differences 
between the past and the present so that the continuing journey of finding knowledge takes into 
account the impossibility of returning to the past. 
 Faded colors cannot be restored and photographs cannot be restaged and relived, but this 
does not mean that they are unimportant. Both illustrate the inevitable passage of time and the 
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impossibility of returning to a past that remains unreachable. Restaged photographs further serve 
as a reminder that photographs do not necessarily convey truth. In such cases, a photographer 
uses an ideal in his mind to create an inauthentic scene that is subsequently photographically 
represented and technologically reproduced, thus removing the photograph three times from 
truth. Where previous texts question the relationship between an idealized appearance and 
reality, Warren’s novel questions the relationship between an idealized past and the present. The 
“tick” and “tock” of time cannot be stopped; thus, the events of the present continue to ripple 
outward, influencing how future generations perceive the past. Future generations, however, 
must realize that photographs are only static images, imperfect representations of a reality that is, 
itself, constantly changing. They must perceive the faded colors and the aging subjects of 
photographs and recognize the disparity between the past and the present as they press ever 




3.4: THE PROLIFIERATION OF REPRESENTATION 
 In the age of digital photography, it is ever easier to take pictures and ever harder to 
remember that pictures represent a static past that moves further away with every passing 
second. Digital photographs do not become discolored or worn, and, even if they are eventually 
printed, a weathered, sun-faded, or otherwise damaged photograph can simply be printed again. 
It would seem that the present age is an age of the proliferation of photography, where everyone 
has photographs of everything. In Don DeLillo’s White Noise, a satirical narrative detailing a 
suburban family’s response to an airborne toxic event, the effects of a postmodern, consumeristic 
culture are at the forefront. The family members, like the others around them, consume 
photographs, images, and representations without pause but ultimately find themselves devoid of 
the truth of beauty, truth, or meaning that photographic representation once promised to convey. 
 Jack Gladney, the father, step-father, and Hitler Studies scholar, is caught between 
nostalgia for the past and the consumerism of the present, and this struggle manifests itself in his 
relationship to photographs. One night, he and his wife, Babette, flip through old family photo 
albums for hours, reflecting nostalgically on an idealized past that they cannot, per Jameson, ever 
reobtain. They look through pictures of “children wincing in the sun, women in sun hats, men 
shading their eyes from the glare as if the past possessed some quality of light we no longer 
experience, a Sunday dazzle that caused people in their churchgoing clothes to tighten their faces 
and stand at an angle to the future, somewhat averted it seemed . . . skeptical of something in the 
nature of the box camera” (DeLillo 30). One can interpret the “quality of light [they] no longer 
experience” (DeLillo 30) as the metaphorical sun of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave”—the sun that 
once conveyed truth and meaning is no longer. The people in the photographs look skeptically at 
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the camera, as if they know that a proliferation of photographs will negatively affect their ability 
to perceive and understand truth.  
 On the other hand, Jack also experiences life in a culture that is inundated with images. 
The Most Photographed Barn in America, a tourist site not far from his house, is a bit of a 
conundrum: people take pictures of it because it is the most photographed barn in America, but it 
is the most photographed barn in America because people continue to take pictures of it. Unlike 
Walter Benjamin, who believes that every technological reproduction of an original reduces its 
aura, Murray, Jack’s colleague, believes that “every photograph reinforces the aura . . . . An 
accumulation of nameless energies” (DeLillo 12). It is important that tourists take photographs of 
the barn so that it can retain its identity.  
In this sense, the photograph establishes identity, but the lens that the tourists place 
between the barn and the eye inhibits their ability to see the barn as it is. Murray suggests that 
“once you’ve seen the signs about the barn, it becomes impossible to see the barn” (DeLillo 12). 
This reflects Sontag’s beliefs that taking pictures at tourist traps is a way for a tourist to claim 
power and seize control of an unpredictable and unfamiliar situation: “A way of certifying 
experience, taking photographs is also a way of refusing it—by limiting experience to a search 
for the photogenic, by converting experience into an image, a souvenir. Travel becomes a 
strategy for accumulating photographs . . . . Most tourists feel compelled to put the camera 
between themselves and whatever is remarkable that they encounter” (Sontag 9-10). The drive to 
accumulate photographs is one that reflects the broader culture of consumerism; places and 
experiences, immaterial things that cannot be bought or collected, can be relegated to a 
photograph that can be collected. Furthermore, Sontag suggests that tourist photography is also a 
“friendly imitation of work” (10) that satisfies the American work ethic that is, of course, driven 
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by consumerism. Although previous texts consider a single representer, whether a painter or a 
photographer, and his or her work, DeLillo introduces thousands of nameless photographers who 
each bring an unknown meaning to his or her own work. The reader of DeLillo’s novel cannot 
know the effects of the photographs on the photographers; instead, one can only observe that the 
photographers choose to participate in the creation of photographs that perpetuate the identity of 
the barn as the Most Photographed Barn in America. 
At the same time, Murray seems to suggest that there is something worthwhile in 
engaging in the ritual of taking pictures of the Most Photographed Barn in America. He says that 
being at the barn “is a kind of spiritual surrender. We’ve agreed to be part of a collective 
perception. This literally colors our vision. A religious experience in a way, like all tourism” 
(DeLillo 12). For Murray, the act of participating in a collective consciousness, a collective 
vision, is more important than the photograph that the tourists take with them when they leave. 
In the field of visual literacy, this collective perception or coloring of vision can be 
interpreted as a rhetorical gaze: “the acts of ‘looking’ that occur both within and around (or at) 
an image: who is looking, how they are looking, why they are looking, where they are looking, 
and who/what is being looked at” (Hesford and Brueggemann 11). Traveling gaze, one iteration 
of rhetorical gaze, involves two major components: identification and difference; the tourist both 
identifies with others and comes to notice the difference that persist between the self and the 
other. In photographing the barn, the tourists can come to know their similarities with each 
other—they are all participating in this single act that perpetuates the identification of the barn as 
the Most Photographed Barn in America—and their differences—whether they use a tripod, a 
telephoto lens, or a filter kit (DeLillo 12). By participating in this cultural phenomenon, an act 
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that Sontag believes is a grab for power and dominance, perhaps the individuals do learn to see 
the face of the other—and, by extension, the faces of themselves. 
Thus, while DeLillo appears to be satirizing the prevalence and proliferation of 
photography in the world today, he also reveals something beautiful about participating in a 
collective consciousness—an aura different than Benjamin’s definition of the aura of the 
original, but an aura, nonetheless. By experiencing that which others have experienced and will 
experience, one can come to better know the other and the self. The removes from truth seem to 
fall away when each person creates an image that is unique to him or her because he or she took 
it; truth seems to be less valuable than a memento from a particular experience. Even though the 
photographs themselves are incapable of returning the tourists to the past, the process of taking 




4: CONCLUSION: PHOTOGRAPHY AS EXPERIENCE 
 
Fig. 2. Munroe, Randall. “Photos.” Webcomic. xkcd. xkcd, 8 Jan. 2014. Web. 6 Apr. 2016. 
 
 From Plato to Magritte to DeLillo, the role of representation has been ever-changing. 
Plato’s fears that representation would remove one further and further from the truth seem to be 
warranted, but this should be feared only if the truth is the ultimate end. Through its use in 
literature, representations have served the purpose of portraying the truth of external realities, but 
they have also inspired the imagination, revealed internal realities, and encouraged participation 
in community experiences. As Figure 2 shows, photography is not only a way to document the 
past, but can also be a way to experience the present and provide even an amateur photographer 
with a new way of looking at and living in the world. Representation may have its faults when 
conveying the truth, but the truth is not the only end of representation—nor is the end only 
beauty, only authenticity, only originality, or only experience.  
 To illustrate the variety of ways in which people experience the world, the image of Don 
DeLillo’s Most Photographed Barn in America can be contrasted with the scenes in which his 
characters experience the sunset. The novel is bookended by the Most Photographed Barn in 
America, a tourist trap that exists because of tourists’ willingness to engage in a consumer 
consciousness, and Jack and his family waiting, along with strangers and neighbors, to watch the 
sun set. They are awed by the sunset, but there is a deeper question of meaning that also arises: 
“we don’t know whether we are watching in wonder or dread, we don’t know what we are 
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watching or what it means, we don’t know whether it is permanent, a level of experience to 
which we will gradually adjust, into which our uncertainty will eventually be absorbed, or just 
some atmospheric weirdness, soon to pass” (DeLillo 324-5). Sontag suggests that photography 
acts as both a poison and a cure, but, in this scene, the world affects Jack in the same way, 
causing him to look at the world differently. Everyone experiences the sunset differently, and 
“there are people walking dogs, there are kids on bikes, [and there is] a man with a camera and 
long lens, waiting for his moment” (DeLillo 325). For a moment, by whatever means—including 
photography—they enter into a shared consciousness that comes from really, truly looking at the 
world. Perhaps photography teaches a certain way of looking at the world that begins with the 
lens of the camera and finishes in the lens of the eye. 
At its inception, photography was concerned with truth-telling. It verified the existence of 
people, places, and things. It showed the world as it was, and not as painters desired it to be. 
Even so, the history of representation, and, specifically, the history of the motif of representation 
in literature, shows a past that is troubled and a future that is uncertain. While photography was 
lauded for its ability to tell the truth, photography soon turned to capturing that which was 
beautiful, then to determining what was beautiful, and finally to rejecting both the true and the 
beautiful in favor of something more ambiguous.  
DeLillo’s meditation on photography, one that both satirizes and praises photography, 
mirrors Sontag’s assertion that one cannot truly know the goodness of a photograph. If 
photography does indeed recycle reality as she asserts, perhaps photography is simply a new way 
of looking at the world, a new gaze through which multitudes of people can interpret their 
surroundings. Perhaps photography is neither good nor bad, neither true nor illusive, or perhaps 
it is both. Perhaps photography, in some sense, defers interpretation, and perhaps each 
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photograph means something different to each person who takes it, even if the image represented 
in the photograph is the same. Perhaps we pay more attention to things when we photograph 
them, and perhaps it is the adventure that matters—not necessarily the adventure or animation of 
looking at the photograph, as Barthes asserts, but in the act of taking a photograph. Perhaps 
photography is an imitation of work, but perhaps it is necessary work—work to understand the 
self, the other, and the context in which the two make meaning of the world. Perhaps we have 
removed ourselves from the concern of removes from truth, a fourth remove from truth that 
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